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The United Kingdom 
JED MEERS  
  
In assessing the aims behind one of the most controversial planks of the UK Coalition 
Government’s welfare reform agenda – a housing benefit penalty for under-occupation, 
commonly known as the “bedroom tax” - Laws LJ stated that in addition to the perceived 
imperative of saving public funds, the change was also seeking to “shift the place of social 
security support in society.”1 There was no elaboration by the court on what was meant by 
this “shift:” whether it was from the national to the local,2 of responsibility and risk to the 
individual and household level,3 in the perceived meaning of “fairness,”3 or to a smaller  
state. 4 It was merely an indication that there was something more to the “core  
augmentation”5 of the “mantra of austerity”6 than simply saving money.  
This chapter is focused on how the courts have engaged with this “shift” in the UK. What 
emerges demonstrates the complexity and inherent limitations in the UK constitutional 
context. The courts have struggled to delineate their role in the wake of this austerity- 
induced shift, with the intensity of proportionality review proving an almost insurmountable 
bar to many claimants’ challenges. The twin-gears of a “cut-and-devolve” approach, where 
 
1 R (MA & others) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWHC 2213. [58] (per Laws LJ)  
2 Patricia Kennett and others, ‘Recession, Austerity and the “Great Risk Shift”: Local Government and  
Household Impacts and Responses in Bristol and Liverpool’ (2015) 41 Local Government Studies 622. 623 
3 ibid. 640  
3 Helen Carr and Dave Cowan, ‘The Social Tenant, the Law and the UK’s Politics of Austerity’ (2015) 5 Oñati 
Socio-legal Series. 83  
4 Martin Smith and Rhonda Jones, ‘From Big Society to Small State: Conservatism and the Privatisation of 
Government’ (2015) 10 British Politics 226. 227  
5 HL Deb, 14 February 2012, c705  
6 Paul O’Connell, ‘Let Them Eat Cake: Socio-Economic Rights in an Age of Austerity’, Human Rights and 
Public  
Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Bloomsbury Publishing 2014). 60  
central budgets are reduced and responsibility for provision pushed downwards to local 
government, introduces complicated multi-level considerations as the welfare reform agenda 
becomes fragmented across institutions. Deficiencies elsewhere lead to an over-reliance on 
limited procedural obligations, which prove ineffective to deal with the complicated 
cumulative effect of large-scale welfare reform programmes. The legal challenges to reforms 
in the Welfare Reform Act 2012, which provide the focus of the discussion which follows, 
demonstrate how these issues, amongst others, render many of the public law tools available 
to claimants challenging such policies largely blunt.  
Given the space available, the discussion here is far from comprehensive. Instead, this chapter 
focuses on some of the key issues which have arisen in legal challenges to the  
Welfare Reform Act 2012. It is in two sections. The first provides a concise overview of the UK 
constitutional context, the motivations for reform, and the importance of (and associated 
problems with) “localism.” The second outlines themes which emerge from the case law: (i) 
the reliance on procedural challenges under equality obligations – particularly the Public 
Sector Equality Duty (PSED) – in the appeals, (ii) the increasing importance of discretionary 
mitigation mechanisms as opposed to statutory exemptions, and how their role in a number 
of flagship reforms raises questions about the ability of discretion at the local authority level 
to sit alongside austerity at the central level, and (iii) the over-reliance and inherent limitations 
of discrimination challenges to assert social rights.  
Section One: Preliminary Issues – The UK Constitution and the Welfare Reform Agenda  
Before turning to an overview of the welfare reform agenda and its accompanying legal 
challenges, it is important to first provide some constitutional context. To attempt to capture 
the UK constitution is a “treacherous affair”7 and many efforts begin by outlining the ongoing 
disagreements over even its basic components. 8  As it is uncodified and comprised of 
conventions, statutes and principles stretching from the 13th Century to the modern day, it 
does not easily lend itself to summary. The focus of this section is far more modest. It seeks to 
 
7 Grégoire Webber, ‘Eulogy for the Constitution That Was’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 468. 470  
8 Douglas Vick, ‘The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution’ (2002) 37 Texas International Law 
Journal. 477  
outline the two elements of the UK constitutional settlement which are of particular 
importance when looking at challenges to welfare reform measures: the incorporation of the 
ECHR into domestic law under the Human Rights Act 1998,9 and the tribunal system of  
redress and its relationship with judicial review.  
The majority of the discussion in this chapter focuses on challenges brought via judicial 
review, and consequently it is worth briefly setting these cases within the broader appeals 
framework in the UK. There are separate tiers of Courts within the UK system, and the nature 
of each of their “constitutional functions” 10 has become increasingly fragmented as the work-
load has been shared between them. At the lower end of the system are the  
statutorily created tribunal courts (the First Tier Tribunal and Upper Tier Tribunal), 11 and at 
the higher end the High Court, Court of Appeal, and finally the Supreme Court.  The bulk of 
judicial oversight in social security cases is serviced by the lower end tribunals. Social security 
payments have their own chamber – the Social Entitlement Chamber – where first instance 
appeals can be heard by (relatively) specialist judges, and the workload tends to be sizable, 
with 507,131 cases lodged in 2012-13 following the introduction of the Welfare Reform Act 
2012. 12  This right to appeal exists for most decisions made by the two administering 
government departments – the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) – and by local authorities in their  
administrative social security functions, but this right is a statutory creation 13  and some 
“benefits” (notably DHPs discussed elsewhere) fall outside of its scope.  
 
9 See s.3 Human Rights Act 1998, which requires the Courts to read primary and subordinate legislation in a 
way which is compatible with convention rights.  
10 Sarah Nason, ‘The Administrative Court, the Upper Tribunal and Permission to Seek Judicial Review’ (2012) 
21 Nottingham Law Journal. 13  
11 See Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007  
12 Jeremy Sullivan, ‘Senior President of Tribunals’ Annual Report’ (2015) 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/senior_president_of_tribunals_annual_report_2015_
final.pdf>.  
13 For example, see: Schedule 7, para 6 Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000; Schedule 2 
Social  
Security Act 1998; and Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker's Allowance and 
Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2013/381  
The FTT considers issues of both law and fact,14 and its decisions can be appealed only on an 
“error of law”15 to the UTT. In some limited circumstances, the UTT can exercise judicial 
review functions akin to that of the High Court, but this is principally limited to immigration 
cases. There is a right to appeal from UTT decisions up to the Court of Appeal. For cases 
without a route for appeal, challenges can be made to decisions by public bodies, and 
secondary legislation itself, in the High Court under judicial review. This is a route mandated 
by common-law, with some imposed procedural requirements under the Civil Procedure 
Rules.  
Judicial review challenges form the bulk of cases under consideration here. There are 
numerous grounds under which a claimant can bring a challenge: illegality, irrationality, 
procedural impropriety and legitimate expectation. The bulk of the cases below – and in 
challenges to welfare reforms more generally – are focused on the “illegality” ground, 
particularly with reference to the procedural duties on public sector decision makers under 
Equality Act 2010 and on the compatibility of administrative action and/or secondary 
legislation with the ECHR articles as domesticated under the Human Rights Act 1998. As a 
relatively tight statutory duty, the former is outlined with reference to specific cases below, 
but the latter warrants some discussion here; particularly with reference to the exercise of 
proportionality.  
Human Rights Act 1998: Proportionality and Judicial Humility  
A fundamental element of the UK constitutional position, particularly in the context of 
challenging welfare reforms, is the incorporation of the ECHR articles into domestic law under 
the Human Rights Act 1998. Its introduction allowed for positive rights-based challenges 
against public authorities under judicial review for the first time. This development, however, 
raises complications. In the UK, there is not an “ex-ante” 16  framework for assessing 
unconstitutional behaviour by constitutional actors, and the  
 
14 s.12(8)(a) Social Security Act 1998   
15 s.11 TCEA 2007  
16 Mark Elliott, ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignity in Legal, Constitutional, and Political Perspective’, 
The Changing Constitution (8th Edition, OUP 2015).28  
incorporation of a statute which encroaches into this territory has the potential to clash with 
the great weight ascribed to the principle of “parliamentary sovereignty”; particularly the 
importance of avoiding the (unelected) judiciary striking down legislation put forward by a 
democratically elected legislature.17  
As a consequence of this, the desire to champion the ECHR rights domestically has been 
“tempered by an equally forceful desire not to overstep the proper boundaries of judicial 
power.” In other words, in not wishing to overstep their constitutional role, Courts should be 
“properly humble about [their] own capacities.”18 This is explicit for qualified rights under the 
convention, with Articles 8-11 allowing for their breach if it can be justified as “necessary in a 
democratic society,” and other articles – for our purposes, particularly the Article 14 
Prohibition of Discrimination – are subject to a “proportionality” assessment, which 
determines whether the interference with a convention right is justified. The principle is well-
established and its logic “impeccable”20 and largely uncontroversial – the problems arise when 
the courts come to apply its constitutive stages.  
Proportionality review is a “structured mechanism”19 which asks the Court to consider four 
key questions: (i) whether the measure adopted pursues a legitimate aim, (ii) whether there is 
a rational connection between the aim pursued and policy adopted, (iii) whether the aim could 
have been achieved using a less intrusive measure, and (iv) whether, on balance, the benefits 
of achieving the aim by the measure outweigh the dis-benefits resulting from the  
restriction of the relevant protected right.20  
Importantly, the severity of the test applied can differ depending on the issue at hand and the 
institution(s) involved, for perfectly valid reasons of “institutional competence and 
democratic legitimacy.” 21  In the context of social security benefits, this has led to the 
 
17 Alison Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2009). 19  
18 R (Lord Carlile of Berriew and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60 (per 
Lady Hale) [105] 20 
 The Rt Hon Lady Justice Arden DBE and Lady Justice Arden, ‘Proportionality: The Way Ahead?’ [2013] 
Public Law 498.  
19 Alan Brady, Proportionality and Deference Under the UK Human Rights Act: An Institutionally Sensitive 
Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012). 6  
20 Frankie McCarthy, ‘Human Rights, Property and the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases 
(Wales) Bill in the Supreme Court’ [2015] Edinburgh Law Review 373. 375  
21 Brady (n 20). 246  
application of the deferential “manifestly without reasonable foundation” test to the first three 
elements of the proportionality exercise outlined above; namely, the aim pursued and its 
connection to the measure, and the intrusiveness of the policy relative to alternative options 
must not be “manifestly without reasonable foundation.” The final question, which calls on 
the court to balance the interests of the community against any interference with protected 
rights, does not lend itself to a varying intensity of review – instead “all relevant interests fall 
to be weighed and balanced.”24  
As will become apparent in the discussion below, despite the clarity of the test and its 
supporting case law, proportionality review has been poorly applied throughout successive 
judicial review challenges to welfare reforms. This is for two key reasons. The test has often 
been applied without the institutional sensitivity required to adequately assess multi-level 
decision making,25 for instance, assessing the legitimacy of a policy aim is more problematic 
in (the very common) cases where local authorities are acting under a statutory obligation. 
The aim of the policy ((i) above) is with the government, but the means of implementing it ((ii) 
and (iii) above) is with the local authority. Second, following this first point, difficulties in 
undertaking the review often results in the Court simply asking whether the policy itself is 
“manifestly without reasonable foundation.” This is a different test, far more akin to a 
Wednesbury unreasonableness articulation of irrationality,26 which fundamentally avoids the 
reasoning demanded by proportionality review. As a central plank of judicial review  
challenges, these issues are revisited below.  
The Welfare Reform Programme: Motivations and Key Policies  
Having provided a primer on the relevant constitutional elements, this section now turns to 
the 2010 Coalition Government’s welfare reform programme. It does not intend to give a 
complete account of the 2010 UK Coalition Government’s welfare reform agenda. To do so 
would leave room for little else. Instead, it highlights some of the key reforms within the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 which underpin the discussion which follows, and briefly assesses 
the Government’s stated motivations for reform. Even the objectives articulated by the 
ministers responsible for the policies, however, can lack clarity or appear contradictory, with 
the Act adhering to what Vieira and Pinto call the “new politics of welfare reform”27 – a 
complicated, intricate, and often self-contradicting set of ideological assumptions and political 
motivations which have provided the context for changes in welfare policy.  
                                                                 
24 
 Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3 [52] (per Mance LJ) 
25 
 Brady (n 20). 18 26 
 For a detailed assessment of the differences between the two, see: Anne Davies and Jack Williams,  
‘Proportionality in English Law’, The Judge and the Proportionate Use of Discretion (Routledge 2016). 73  
27 
 Mónica Brito Vieira and Pedro Ramos Pinto, ‘Understanding the New Politics of Welfare Reform’ 61 Political  
Studies 474  
Despite difficulties in teasing out a “shared rhetorical position” on welfare policy, 22  the 
Coalition Government was clear that the “core argumentation” behind the reforms in the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 was “austerity” in response to the global financial crisis. Its measures 
were designed to reduce expenditure on welfare payments by £19 billion a year across the 
2010-2015 Parliamentary term, with – excluding changes to the state pension – “few stones left 
unturned.”23 There were multiple changes to housing benefit, both by tenants claiming in the 
private rented sector (under Local Housing Allowance (LHA)) and the social rented sector, 
with new caps, penalties and changes to uprating introduced affecting hundreds of thousands 
of households. Disability benefits were also subject to sizable retrenchment, 24  with the 
replacement of the UK’s principle disability benefit, Disability Living Allowance (DLA), with 
a “more rigorously tested” Personal Independence Payment (PIP). 25  A “benefit cap” was 
introduced for all claimants receiving working-age benefits (excluding disability benefits), set 
at £500 per week for couples and families, and £350 for single people26 – though this has since 
been reduced in the Welfare Reform and Work Bill 2015. This has been coupled with a heavily 
increased sanctions programme (of up to 3 years of social security support withdrawal) for 
 
22 Richard Hayton and Libby McEnhill, ‘Rhetoric and Morality - How the coalition justifies welfare policy’ in 
Judi Atkins and others (eds), Rhetoric in British Politics and Society (Palgrave MacMillian 2014) 102  
23 Ian Cole, ‘Is a Little Knowledge about Welfare a Dangerous Thing? A Small Scale Study into Attitudes 
Towards, and Knowledge About, Welfare Expenditure.’ (2015) 9 People, Place & Policy Online. 50  
24 For a more detailed discussion of the impact of Welfare Reform Act 2012 reforms to those with disabilities, 
see Neville Harris, ‘Welfare Reform and the Shifting Threshold of Support for Disabled People’ (2014) 77 The 
Modern Law Review 888. 926  
25 Kayleigh Garthwaite, ‘Fear of the Brown Envelope: Exploring Welfare Reform with Long-Term Sickness 
Benefits Recipients’ (2014) 48 Social Policy & Administration 782. 784  
26 See s.96 Welfare Reform Act 2012  
those claiming unemployment benefits who do not meet the requirements of their 
personalised “claimant commitments,” such as non-attendance at interviews.27  
Some of these reforms are still ongoing; chiefly the fundamental re-packaging of multiple 
inwork and out-of-work benefits (Housing Benefit, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance and 
Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, Working Tax Credits, and Child Tax 
Credits) and other payments, such as child care subsidies, into one, “simplified” payment 
under Universal Credit.28 The policy is the “centrepiece” of the Government’s “make work 
pay” agenda, 29  and is designed to simplify the benefits system, 30  increase the financial 
incentives to work, and save money –estimated at £2.7 billion per year due to reduced 
administration costs and lower unemployment.37 The new benefit is currently being rolled out 
in pathfinder areas using a “lobster pot” principle, where simple cases (principally, single 
unemployed individuals) are taken onto the scheme, and remain on it as their circumstances 
change.31 It is due to rolled out for availability at all job centres by spring 2016.32  
Before turning to some of the issues which have arisen in the challenges to these reforms, it is 
worth noting three key things about the motivations behind the Welfare Reform Act 2012.  
Firstly, “austerity” is not the only explicit factor behind its implementation; the economic 
principles behind austerity are invariably accompanied by the political promotion of 
individual responsibility for welfare provision.33 The reforms follow the green paper “21st 
Century Welfare”34 and the white paper “Universal Credit: Welfare that Works”35 which both 
 
27 Ruth Patrick, ‘Working on Welfare: Findings from a Qualitative Longitudinal Study Into the Lived 
Experiences of Welfare Reform in the UK’ (2014) 43 Journal of Social Policy 705.  
28 Philip M Larkin, ‘The New Puritanism: The Resurgence of Contractarian Citizenship in Common Law 
Welfare States’ (2014) 41 Journal of Law and Society 227. 250  
29 Christina Beatty, Steve Fothergill and Donald Houston, ‘The Impact of the UK’s Disability Benefit Reforms’, 
Disability Benefits, Welfare Reform and Employment Policy, vol (eds) Colin Lindsay and Donald Houston. 148  
30 Larkin (n 33). 250 37 
 Helen Kowalewska, ‘Diminishing Returns: Lone Mothers’ Financial Work Incentives and Incomes under the 
Coalition’ (2015) FirstView Social Policy and Society 1.  
31 HL Deb, 18 June 2014, c907  
32 HC Deb, 6 July 2015, cW  
33 Kevin Farnsworth and Zoë Irving, ‘Varieties of Crisis, Varieties of Austerity: Social Policy in Challenging 
Times’ 20 Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 133. 134  
34 st 
Department of Work and Pensions, ‘21 Century Welfare’ (2010)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181139/21st-
centurywelfare_1_.pdf> accessed 25 June 2015.  
35 Department of Work and Pensions, ‘Universal Credit: Welfare that Works’ (2010)  
underscore ideological motivations distinct from simply furthering austerity with welfare 
reforms. Instead they seek to dis-incentivise what is perceived as a national problem of 
“benefit dependency”36 and facilitate an “activation turn” in welfare policy.37   
Secondly, many of the welfare reforms, or mechanisms designed to mitigate them, are 
administered or implemented at the Local Authority level.38 This has led to austerity being 
tied with “localism,” or the more short-lived idea of the “Big Society,”39 which prioritise local 
authority and community decision-making over that of central government. In the context of 
welfare reform, however, this can prove problematic – especially at a time when new 
responsibilities are given alongside tighter budgets. Some argue this renders any premise of 
real local decision-making “hollow,”40 and it raises some particular problems in legal appeals, 
as discussed below.  
  
Finally, it is worth noting that the package of policy changes in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 
overlap and intersect in complicated ways – both in how they function, and their overall 
impact on those affected by them. By way of illustration, there were 20 individual equality 
impact assessments for the Welfare Reform Act 2012 alone; each of which detailing potential 
issues for protected groups connected to their own constituent provision, but neglecting 
completely to assess how they may link together in the patchwork of reforms as a whole.41 
This cumulative impact problem is discussed in more detail with reference to procedural 
challenges below.  
 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181145/universal-creditfull-
document.pdf> accessed 25 June 2015.  
36 Peter Dwyer and Sharon Wright, ‘Universal Credit, Ubiquitous Conditionality and Its Implications for Social 
Citizenship’ (2014) 22 Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 27. 33  
37 Mark Simpson and Mark Simpson, ‘“Designed to Reduce People...to Complete Destitution”: Human Dignity 
in the Active Welfare State’ [2015] European Human Rights Law Review 66. 70  
38 Erika Kispeter and Sue Yeandle, ‘Local Welfare Policy in a Centralised Governance System: Childcare and 
Eldercare Services in a Period of Rapid Change in Leeds’, Local Welfare Policy Making in European Cities 
(Springer 2015). 107  
39 Smith and Jones (n 5).  
40 Erika Kispeter and Sue Yeandle (n 44). 104  
41 For access to these documents, see https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/welfare-reform-act-
2012equality-impact-assessments   
Interrogating Localism: An extension of “austerity localism”  
As outlined above, the welfare reform agenda in the UK has been characterised by a “cut and 
devolve” approach; namely, reducing centrally administered budgets for programmes or 
individual social security payments, and then placing the onus on local authorities or other 
decentralised bodies to manage or mitigate the impact.42 This approach has a clear rationale 
embedded in the “localism” discourse.50 The principle is a simple one: if savings to welfare 
programmes have to be made, those closest to the impact are better placed to implement, 
mitigate or target them than a central Government department. This approach, however, 
warrants examination, particularly when “localism” becomes tied to an “austerity” 
programme – described elsewhere as “sink or swim localism”43 or “austeritylocalism.”44 There 
are many implications of this hybrid approach, but within the focus of this chapter there are 
four key problems of this “fetishisation” 45 of localism which have manifested themselves in 
the second section.  
First, there is an assumption that because many of the most pertinent impacts of reducing 
social security expenditure are discernible at the local level, solutions to them are best served 
at that level as well. This fails to recognise the problematic political asymmetry between the 
two: by reducing central expenditure and pushing decisions downwards, Governments can 
“externalise responsibility”54 for the impacts of spending reductions, while Local Authorities 
find themselves in a “political cul-de-sac,”46 unable to change their fundamental basis. The 
contradiction between these two political scales can serve to distance the “electoral 
 
42 See the discussion of the Independent Living Fund and the Council Tax Reduction Scheme outlined elsewhere 
in this chapter. 50 
 See Elena Vacchelli, ‘Localism and Austerity: A Gender Perspective’ [2015] 80 Soundings: A journal of 
politics and culture 83.; and Chris Grover, ‘Localism and Poverty in the United Kingdom: The Case of Local 
Welfare Assistance’ (2012) 33 Policy Studies 349. 351  
43 Vivien Lowndes and Lawrence Pratchett, ‘Local Governance under the Coalition Government: Austerity, 
Localism and the “Big Society”’ (2012) 38 Local Government Studies 21.  
44 David Featherstone and others, ‘Progressive Localism and the Construction of Political Alternatives’ (2012) 




 Lowndes and Pratchett (n 50).  
46 Frank Gaffikin, ‘Paradoxes in Local Planning in Contested Societies’, Reconsidering Localism (Routledge 
2015). 56 
 John Huber and Charles Shipan, Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic 
Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2002). 2  
connection” between the voters and those with responsibility for policy56 - in other words, it 
places responsibility for controversial policies on Local Authorities who are not politically 
responsible for their implementation or design.  
Second, in shifting this responsibility to the local level, it may be that that this guise of 
“localism” is not “politically innocent” 47 – rather, it is seeking to avoid explicitly delineating 
the boundaries of who will, and importantly will not, be affected by individual policies. 
Devolving these problematic issues down to local authority levels can serve as a form of 
political sleight of hand, moving the legislative focus away from arguments over who should 
bear the burden of reductions in social security expenditure, and towards the discussion of 
local authority provision for these decisions. In other words, conflicts are “deliberately 
fudged.” 48  This process has had explicit attention elsewhere, particularly in the “blame 
avoidance” literature, which argues that in the exercise of welfare retrenchment, governments 
will attempt to “minimise” the visibility of reform in its legislative design.49  
Third, and linked to this second issue, this view of how discretion fits into the delivery of the 
austerity agenda requires a new approach than that offered by the “conventional view”60 of 
public law approaches, which often regard discretion through the (in)famous Dworkin 
analogy of the “hole in the doughnut,”50 or as a “black box” through which public law rights 
are “refracted.” 51  Both of these perspectives understand discretion through the structural 
position it occupies in the delivery of determined policy aims; either discretion is pari passu 
with rules with both negatively correlated with each other, or discretion distorts the intention 
behind the rules which bring it into being. The first two points above highlight how this 
structural view of discretion becomes unsettled in this “localism-austerity” context, where 
 
47 Featherstone and others (n 51). 178  
48 Tony Prosser, ‘The Politics of Discretion: Aspects of Discretionary Power in the Supplementary Benefits 
Scheme’, Discretion and Welfare (Heinemann 1981). 150  
49 Giuliano Bonoli, ‘Blame Avoidance and Credit Claiming Revisited’, The Politics of the New Welfare State 
(2012). 93 60 
 Anna Pratt and Lorne Sossin, ‘A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion’ (2009) 24 301.  
50 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury Publishing 2013) 31   
51 Tony Prosser (n 57). 150 63 
Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3 [52] (per Mance LJ)  
discretion’s role is not relative to its legislative purpose, but instead avoids the articulation of 
that purpose altogether.  
Fourth, these issues pose particular problems for the Courts when assessing proportionality 
in human rights based challenges. The proportionality exercise demands, inter alia, that 
“weighing all relevant factors, the measure adopted achieves a fair or proportionate balance 
between the public interest being promoted and the other interests involved.”63 Within this 
“austerity localism” context, however, this balancing exercise cannot operate on a common 
scale; namely, it shifts the focus away from the justification of the policy, and towards a 
justification of localism. Put another way, the Government is granted deference for its own 
decision-making, even when this decision is to push responsibility downwards to local 
authorities. This leads to the deferential tests discussed elsewhere in this chapter – principally 
the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” bar – being applied not to the potential 
discrimination by the policy itself, but instead the mechanism of pushing the decision 
downwards.  
This results in judgments which are dominated by the consideration of “imaginary  
administrative decisions”52 which, by virtue of the availability of judicial review to challenge  
them, can be presumed to be convention compliant. This has arisen particularly with reference 
to DHPs, where their availability – and the assumption that they will be awarded lawfully – 
justifies the supporting legislation, as opposed to the Courts directing their attention to the 
questions at the heart of the proportionality appeal.65 This approach at best abates the intensity 
of the proportionality review, and at worst, renders the bar so high as to be almost 
unassailable.  
These four issues do not mean that “localism” is always problematic or misguided. Instead, it 
simply highlights that the current constitutional protections within the UK are illequipped to 
deal with the coupling of an austerity agenda mitigated or implemented at the local level. This 
allocation of resource and responsibility amongst tiers of government is a significant change 
 
52 Brady (n 20). 18 65 
 See Rutherford [46] (per Stuart-Smith J), - The Queen on the application of A v The Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2015] EWHC 159 (Admin) [65] (per Worcester HHJ), MA  [82] (per Dyson MR)   
to the “administrative constitution,” 53  rather than simply being a dry issue of policy 
implementation. In other words, “localism” must be some sort of end in its own right, as 
opposed to simply a means of delivering or alleviating the hardship caused by policies 
determined at the central level. In the context of assessing government motivations for the 
welfare reform agenda, this end is not articulated well, or often, at all.  
Section Two: Assessing themes in the legal challenges  
Procedural Challenges and the Importance of Cumulative Impact  
  
Given the clear focus of the reforms on those in receipt of certain benefits – especially housing 
and disability benefits – they overlap with each other within certain constituencies of 
claimants to create a complicated cumulative impact.  This has the potential to exasperate the 
severity of the reforms for certain populations; particularly those with disabilities who live in 
social housing, who are both disproportionately affected by social security and housing 
benefit reforms, 54 and also less likely to be able to affect a change in their circumstances by, 
for instance, finding work or moving property.55  
This cumulative impact causes problems for the Courts, particularly when assessing 
procedural obligations on the Government, such as the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED).56 
The picture is complicated by two further factors.  
Firstly, overlapping reforms can cause problems in the utilisation of discretionary mitigation 
mechanisms (principally in the form of DHPs, discussed in more detail below). The “cutand-
devolve” approach prioritises localised discretionary pots of financial assistance over 
centrally determined exemptions; however, the cumulative impact of reforms can lead to 
 
53 Tony Prosser, ‘Constitutionalising Austerity in Europe’ [2015] Public Law 111. 112  
54 Simon Duffy, ‘A fair society? How the cuts target disabled people’ (2013)  
<http://www.centreforwelfarereform.org/uploads/attachment/354/a-fair-society.pdf> accessed 25 June 2015.  
55 Social Security Advisory Committee, ‘The Cumulative Impact of Welfare Reform’ (2014)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/324059/ssac_occasional_p 
aper_12_report.pdf> accessed 25 June 2015. 30  
56 S.149 Equality Act 2010  
difficulties in both determining the severity and case of a claimant’s need, and also the 
sufficiency of budgets allocated for such mitigation.  
This complexity is worsened as a result of the austerity agenda stretching across multiple 
departments. As outlined in the first section of this report, cuts made elsewhere in government 
can spill into the same households affected by welfare reforms. A good example can be seen 
in the scrapping of Educational Maintenance Allowance; a payment of up to £30 per week for 
students aged 16-18 in full-time education from low-income families. O’Hara highlights how 
this measure disproportionately affects the same constituency of claimants as the SSSC, 
adding a further annual loss to the household of £1,260.57 Moreover, this effect can be seen in 
the operation of mitigation mechanisms as well. Ongoing research by Lupton has identified 
that teachers at schools in areas with particularly low socio-economic indicators, are utilising 
Pupil Premium71 funds to provide support to families affected by welfare reform measures, 
which has included buying food and providing clothing.58 This demonstrates how the changes 
induced by welfare reform measures can alter the context in which other reforms – many with 
aims not connected to welfare reform at all, like the Pupil Premium – operate.  
  
The Public Sector Equality Duty  
  
Before turning to the inability of the procedural obligations to deal with the problem of 
compound impact, it is worth first outlining the nature, and limits, of the duty in two key 
cases appealing high profile welfare reforms. Under the PSED, set out in s.149 Equality Act 
2010, all public bodies must in the exercise of their functions “have due regard to the need to:” 
(i) eliminate discrimination to those with protected characteristics (such as gender, race, and 
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 A Government fund introduced in April 2011 providing approximately £600 million per annum to assist 
schools at increasing the attainment of disadvantaged pupils. The money can be used at the discretion of the 
school itself (with some government controls and accounting/reporting measures).  
58 Ruth Lupton, ‘What Is the Impact of the “bedroom Tax” on Children and Schools?’ (15 April 2014) 
<http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/featured/2014/04/what-is-the-impact-of-the-bedroom-tax-on-childrenand-
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having a disability) 59 , (ii) advance equality of opportunity, and (iii) foster good relations 
between those with a protected characteristic, and those without.  
There is a sizable body of case law, described in Bracking as “two lever arch files”60 worth, 
which has built up around the interpretation of this duty. These do not warrant detailed 
consideration here. It is important, however, to note the emphasis given by the Courts on the 
existence of an “important evidential element”61 which can demonstrate the “recording of 
steps taken by the decision maker to meet their statutory requirements,” and that the minister 
must “assess the risk and extent of any adverse impact.”62 This does not have to be in the form 
of a formal equality impact assessment, but the Courts will assess whether there has been 
compliance as matter of fact, with close scrutiny of evidence put before them.77   
The duty has been described as being of “incredible importance in preventing the full burden 
of austerity being carried by the most vulnerable in society,”63 and a “heavy burden upon 
public authorities” 64  – however, it still suffers from severe limitations in the context of 
challenging welfare reform packages.   
Though it is regularly bolted-on to other challenges, the judicial review appeals which 
followed the closure of the Independent Living Fund (ILF) provide a particularly notable 
example of the problem at hand .Before its closure, and despite a complex history, the ILF 
worked with local authorities to provide care packages for people with disabilities totally 
£360million per annum.65 In R. (on the application of Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions66 the decision to dissolve the fund, cut the budget, and transfer the remaining money 
to local authorities to administer (though not in a ring-fenced way) was challenged under the 
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 Tom Hickman and Tom Hickman, ‘Too Hot, Too Cold or Just Right? The Development of the Public Sector  
Equality Duties in Administrative Law’ [2013] Public Law 325. 339  
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65 R. (on the application of Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWHC 897 (Admin) 
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PSED. The Court considered that the “true message”67 of a prior consultation on the impact of 
this decision had not been communicated to the minister, the impact had consequently not 
been properly considered, and the PSED not met.  
This judgment is often heralded to as an example of the high bar that the PSED places on 
decision-makers.68 In his judgment, McCombe LJ underscored that the duty is a heavy burden 
upon public authorities,”69 and there was a duty to provide “hard evidence”70 that it had been 
sufficiently discharged. Indeed, he went as far to suggest that issues of equality should be 
“placed at the centre of formulation of policy” if and when they arise.71   
The closure of the fund provides an ideal case study to examine the PSED as, following the 
judgment of the Court, a new minister was appointed and the same decision was taken again. 
Many of the same claimants and mostly the same lawyers, brought a challenge on this second 
decision to close the fund in R (on the application of Aspinall, Pepper and others) v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions.72 Effectively, the same legal argument was re-run as  
the “Minister was no better informed about those matters this time round than his  
predecessor was.”73   
The issue before the Court was a fairly routine application of a narrow PSED consideration: 
did the minister “have sufficient material before him to be able to truly appreciate the 
implications of closing the ILF for those most likely to be affected by its closure.”74 The Court 
was satisfied that “it was certainly not a tick-box exercise” conducted in a legal or factual 
vacuum’75 and the criticisms that were levied at the use of this material in Bracking were not 
held to be applicable here, and the particular focus on the narrower ground of the Minister 
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requiring more information to adequately discharge his duty – particularly on the numbers 
who would be affected – was dismissed categorically by the Court. 76  Indeed, Andrews J 
suggested that “short of going down the pilot scheme route…there was nothing that he could 
have done that would have left him any better informed than the results of the consultation 
did.”77 On the specific point raised by the claimants of knowing the numbers of people affected 
in more detail, it was held that “[the minister] did not need to know precisely how many of 
them were likely to be affected or to carry out a quantitative assessment of the impact. It 
sufficed that he knew, as he did, that the impact would be  
substantial and significant.”78   
The unsuccessful challenges in Aspinal79 - and in cases dealing with other reforms, such as 
Zacchaeus 2000 Trust80 - demonstrate the heavy limitations on a procedural duty to challenge 
welfare reforms. In Aspinal,81 the same decision was taken as in Bracking, with broadly the 
same evidence, but with the supporting documentation re-drafted to meet the requirements 
of the PSED. As highlighted by the court, the minister did not need to know how many  
people would be affected; simply that a lot of people would be affected badly. 82  
Consequently, these procedural duties are a sizable administrative burden, but are often 
relegated to a test of administrative competence rather than whether issues of equality were 
“placed at the centre of formulation of policy.”83 This is perhaps to be expected of what is, by 
its very nature, a procedural duty. However, in light of the issue of the cumulative nature of 
welfare reform programmes, there are further problems with a reliance on procedural  
challenges.  
Firstly, as has been the case in all of the PSED challenges following the Welfare Reform Act 
2012, any potential adverse impact is assessed on the policy’s own terms. No attempt has been 
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made by the Government to undertake a cumulative impact assessment for those with 
protected characteristics – such as those with disabilities – for the reforms dealt with in this  
chapter. 84 Despite undertaking analysis on the distributional effects of multiple policies across 
household income distributions,85 even if one is able to focus down on narrow ranges of 
income, pockets of compound impact can be easily lost given its concentration on a number 
of relatively small constituencies who may not be easily identified by income alone. 86 Indeed, 
research by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which has attempted to address this 
lacuna, suggests that the cumulative impact of welfare reform is  
“substantial and widespread.”87  
The inability of individual equality impact assessments to sufficiently address risks of adverse 
impacts has been highlighted elsewhere. Shandu and Stephenson have seen this same 
problem in their assessment of equality impact assessments at the local government level,88 
and the Social Security Advisory Committee have recommended that some form of 
cumulative impact assessments are introduced for some populations affected by welfare 
reforms, so potential adverse impacts can be addressed, “particularly to the most vulnerable 
claimants.” 89 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, following submissions 
made on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, have themselves also called for a unified assessment 
of the likely cumulative impact of the welfare reforms,90  following the Equality and Human 
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Rights Commission describing a single department being responsible for monitoring and 
assessing the cumulative impact of spending review and budget decisions as “vital.”91  
  
The appeals for impact to be addressed more adequately resulted in a petition calling for a 
cumulative impact assessment for welfare reforms on people with disabilities being debated 
in parliament.92 The Government position is that a “cumulative impact assessment would be 
so complex and subject to so many variables that it would be meaningless.”93 It is suggested 
here that there are two problems with this assertion. Firstly, the argument here is not that the 
cumulative effect of all government welfare reforms on those with protected characteristics 
should be considered in detail. Instead, it is suggested that the interdependency of certain 
aspects of the welfare reform package is so great, that at least some consideration of their 
interaction must be warranted in order to assess the potential for adverse impact. For example, 
in separate judicial review challenges to the SSSC, Benefit Cap, and changes to Local Housing 
Allowance, when assessing justification of the regulations, the existence of DHPs were 
considered alongside that of the benefit reductions – in other words, the issue of justification 
was assessed on the “scheme as a whole.” 94  When satellite schemes are integral to the 
functioning of the policy consideration, limiting assessments to the impact of one policy 
simply on its own terms is clearly insufficient.  
  
Secondly, it would simply be necessary for the Government to consider the cumulative impact, 
by exploring potential overlaps between policies and the consequent risk for those with 
protected characteristics, not to “produce the perfect study.” 95  Other organisations have 
already produced cumulative impact reports of their own, for example: the Equality and 
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Human Rights Commission; 96  the Children’s Commissioner; 97  Contact a Family; 98  and the 
Scottish Parliament’s Welfare Reform Committee. 99  As suggested by the Social Security 
Advisory Committee, “such methodological problems [are not] insurmountable to the extent 
that headline findings cannot be produced.”100  
  
The Importance of Discretion: The Rise of Discretionary Housing Payments  
  
One of the most notable features of the current welfare reform programme has been its 
dependence on discretionary forms of mitigation as opposed to statutory exemptions. This 
has been principally in the form of Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs); a previously  
“very small”101 scale form of discretionary relief distinct from the benefits system introduced 
in 2001. The growing expectations of these payments to mitigate the impact of changes to 
social security,102 and the associated burden they have shouldered in legal appeals,103 has led 
to their use growing dramatically from approximately 2,000 awards annually in 2002/3,104 to 
more than 390,000 in 2013/14.105  
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In the Coalition Government’s effort to avoid “standing back and imposing something,”106 this 
“DHP strategy”107 has introduced a layer of administrative discretion. DHPs have become the 
only viable mitigating mechanism for many of those affected by the Coalition Government’s 
flagship welfare reforms, particularly the SSSC, the Benefit Cap, and changes to Local Housing 
Allowance. Following the Conservative Government’s budget on 8th July 2015, their use is set 
to grow further, with £800million earmarked for DHPs across the course of the next 
Parliament.108  
  
The payments have proven to be essential for the continued legality of the SSSC and the benefit 
cap, but the case law itself produces an inherent irony. The underpinning regulations grant 
few statutory exemptions, seemingly in a bid to avoid enforceable legal rights and consequent 
“juridification of welfare,”109 however the courts have carved a function for DHPs which 
attempts to re-create the effect of such statutory exemptions in certain  
circumstances.   
  
The section details the role of these payments in three sections. The first looks at the 
underpinning DHP regulations and how the scheme has evolved since its inception in 2001. 
The second looks at the way in which the Courts have treated the payments, particularly as a 
source of justification for otherwise unlawful discrimination. The final section makes some 
conclusions about their future judicial scrutiny, drawing on recent case law.  
  
The evolution of the scheme: The introduction of DHPs  
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108 Summer Budget 2015 (8 July 2015),  
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In common with most of the social security system, the DHP scheme does not lend itself easily 
to a clear and concise description. Mummery LJ remarked of its under-pinning regulations 
that “I would not award it the top prize in a competition for plain English.”110 Most of the 
relevant statutory provisions, however, can be found within the Discretionary Financial 
Assistance Regulations 2001, 111112 which outlines the features of and eligibility requirements 
for the payments, and the Discretionary  Housing  Payments (Grants)  Order  2001,113114 which 
details how local authorities can claim the cost of DHPs back from central Government. In 
summary, the DWP provides an initial allocation of funds to Local Authorities based on a 
series of welfare reform impact measures and data on previous baseline DHP expenditure,115 
which the Local Authority can then award to claimants who are in receipt of housing benefit 
and apply for support with their rent.  
  
There are two areas of statutory control on this process. Firstly, there are limits on the amount 
of money which can be spent by the local authority on awarding DHPs. Aside from their initial 
allocation by the DWP, 116 local authorities can top-up the DHP funds available using their 
own finances, but only to 2.5 times the original allocation.  Secondly, awards can only be made 
to those receiving housing benefit to assist with rent or “housing costs,”117 they cannot exceed 
the eligible rent for the property118 or cover certain statutorily exempted areas, such as benefit 
sanctions or service charges.119 Aside from this local authorities are left largely to their own 
devices to decide how to make DHP awards, bound only by the general principles of public 
law. The payment of DHPs is distinct from the payment of housing benefit. Though there is a 
right to a written decision with stated reasons 120  and to seek review, 121  the payments fall 
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outside of para.6 of schedule 7 to the Child Support, Pensions and Social Act 2000 and are 
therefore outside of the jurisdiction of a First-tier Tribunal.122   
  
Panacean Payments: The treatment of DHPs in case-law  
  
Despite being introduced in 2001, there has been a number of legal challenges to DHPs which 
have attempted to clarify their function, especially regarding their role in the assessment of 
proportionality and adherence to equality duties.123 This section focuses more tightly on their 
role in response to reforms in the Welfare Reform Act 2012, and particularly the SSSC, where 
cases have been dominated with the consideration of these payments. Indeed, Dyson MR in 
R. (On the Application of MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions124 indicates that “if read 
in isolation and without regard to the DHP scheme [the SSSC] plainly discriminates” 125 
against the disabled, so it is necessary to analyse “the scheme as a whole.”126   
  
The cases have turned principally on familiar arguments around discrimination using Article 
1 of the First Protocol (right to property), which is now well established as including housing 
benefit,127 or Article 8 (right to respect for the home), to leverage the Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination). There are four key elements which unite the cases on how indirect 
discrimination can be “justified” through the presence of DHPs.  
  
Firstly, there is a common recognition that the adoption of DHPs as opposed to a statutory 
exemption is about more than simply servicing “austerity;” the courts instead accept that there 
is an ideological undercurrent which informs the changes.  This is reflected in the title to this 
chapter, which echoes the assertion by LJ Laws that the intention of the SSSC is, in part, to 
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“shift the place of social security in society.”128 This is important, as discriminatory treatment 
is difficult to justify solely for the purposes of saving money,129 so aligning the policy scheme 
with other more loosely defined aims - such as localism130 and the “social and political” aspects 
of the austerity agenda131 - helps to provide further supplementary aims.  
  
This bleeds into the second key issue of the welfare reform agenda being  
“unquestionably”132 sited within the rubric of “high policy,”133 which leads to the application  
of the deferential “manifestly without reasonable foundation” test 134 . This “strong  
deferential tenor”135 sets an incredibly high bar for the claimants to pass, as the Court has to 
be satisfied that there is a “serious flaw” in the scheme which produces a discriminatory  
effect.136   
  
Thirdly, DHPs are considered to align with these high policy aims by demonstrating  
characteristics which advance the vague notions of “localism”137 and “austerity”138 tied to the 
reforms, being described as exhibiting an element of “local accountability,”139 flexibility in 
responding to changing needs (such as variability in severity of disability), 140  and being 
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These beneficial characteristics articulated by the DWP and in the latter case law sit at odds 
with the disparaging treatment given to them in the earlier case of Burnip v Birmingham City 
Council,142 where the payments’ temporary nature and consequent lack of reliability were  
given as reasons why they could not “come anywhere near providing an adequate  
justification for the discrimination” in cases involving children with disabilities being unable 
to share a room. 143  The Burnip treatment has been distinguished from the present policy 
environment on the basis that the overall DHP pot has been kept under review and has been 
increased, alongside the Welfare Reform Act reforms taking place in the ‘shadow of the  
financial crisis.’144  
  
Finally, following the interpretation in the later cases of Rutherford,145 Cotton146 and A,147 it is 
clear that the justification of discrimination caused by the SSSC’s current formation is 
dependent not only on the existence of the DHP scheme itself, but also on adequate  
assurances of the stability of the mitigation it provides in cases where there would otherwise 
be unlawful discrimination. Despite the “understandable anxiety [and] stress”148 of making 
applications, or periods where the shortfall is not covered, “the use of DHPs as the conduit 
for payment may be justifiable, [but] it will not be justified if it fails to provide suitable  
assurance of present and future payment in appropriate circumstances.” 149 This  
requirements sits awkwardly alongside the widespread recognition of local authorities that 
DHPs are “not intended as a long term solution,”150 particularly for those affected by the 
socalled “bedroom tax.”   
  
Future Directions in the Judicial Treatment of DHPs  
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In the majority of the case law following the Welfare Reform Act 2012, DHPs have been 
considered as part of the justification for other regulations – particularly the SSSC. However, 
the High Court has heard a judicial review of the application of DHPs themselves in R. (on the 
application of Hardy) v Sandwell MBC,151 which dealt with the assessment of Disability Living 
Allowance/Personal Independence Payments (the principle disability benefits within the UK, 
with the former transitioning over to the latter) as income when applying for DHP 
applications.  
  
This judgment is significant, as it highlights the potential for the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) to act as an interpretive guide to the 
application of Article 14 in cases involving DHPs. This is a significant development, 
particularly given the prevalence of disability amongst those affected by the measures DHPs 
seek to mitigate,152 and the propensity of the UNCRDP to create a “heightened standard of 
scrutiny” 153  when considering discrimination against those with disabilities. With this in 
mind, there are three key points worth considering here.  
  
First, Hardy held that DHPs engage the first part of the first protocol (right to property). 
Though it is clearly established that Housing Benefit falls under Art.1/1, DHPs have  
generally fallen outside of this definition as they are not a prescribed form of benefit.154 The 
Court, however, highlighted the necessity of DHPs to ensure the legality of the SSSC, and as 
such they formed “an integral part of HB entitlements for disabled applicants,” and they have 
“at least a legitimate expectation that they will be used to supplement a shortfall.”155 This 
demonstrates the sizable difference travelled from the discretionary scheme outlined above.  
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The second key issue is how the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, or the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, can assist with the interpretation 
of discrimination and justification in the context of these discretionary payments. When 
assessing the justification of the “benefit cap” in R. (on the application of JS) v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions, 156  the Justices disagreed on the applicability of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as an interpretive guide to Article 14. The issue was the 
drawing of a conduit between the type of discrimination alleged and the party affected (a 
problem below in section four); with a majority of the Court deciding that the claimants could 
not justify using a treaty concerning one group (children) to assist in the interpretation of 
discrimination against another (women).157  
  
However, it is clear that there is a link between any tenants with disabilities and the UNCRPD. 
This is underscored in Burnip with reference to the overall legislative scheme for Local 
Housing Allowance, where although the case turned on other grounds, Maurice J indicated 
that he would have been willing to use the UNCRPD as a guide for his  
interpretation of Art.14 and find in favour of the claimants on that basis.158  
  
This could be significant in future appeals to the welfare measures contained within the  
Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the lowering of the benefit cap in the Welfare Reform and Work 
Bill 2015. Article 19 UNCRPD in particular offers the potential to “illuminate our approach to 
both discrimination and justification”159 in cases involving housing benefit, given its focus on 
the right of those with disabilities to live independently and choose their place of residence 
on an equal basis to others.160 Broderick goes as far as to suggest an eventual “fusion” between 
ECHR’s treatment of disability discrimination and the norms of the UNCRPD, 161 and the 
majority position of the Supreme Court in JS demonstrates the important interpretative role 
the convention could play in future appeals to housing benefit changes.  
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In the wake of the Welfare Reform and Work Bill 2015, DHPs look set to continue to play a 
central role in the delivery of ongoing reforms to welfare, and consequently, their  
lawfulness. The 2015 July Budget identified a total allocation of £800 million across the next 
parliament for DHPs, to “help ensure Local Authorities are able to protect the most vulnerable 
housing benefit claimants,”162 and the flagship Universal Credit – gradually rolling out across 
the country - utilises DHPs as a form of discretionary mitigation. Their use as a means of 
mitigating the effects of the policy has broad support in the house; the argument has been 
more focused on the funding provided for them. Indeed, the Labour Party put forward an 
amendment to bill to require the Social Security Advisory Committee to review the DHP 
funding levels each year.163 To what extent they can provide mitigation from reforms for 
vulnerable populations in the face of increasing expectations, remains to be seen, but DHPs 
are set to stay.  
  
Drawing Conduits: Protected Groups and the Reliance on Discrimination  
  
As is clear from the discussion above, most of the challenges following the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012 have been facilitated by arguments based on equality and discrimination, either 
through procedural obligations such as those imposed by the Equality Act 2010, or through 
human rights protections under Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). This approach can 
only assert the social rights of those who are in protected categories – either those with 
‘protected characteristics’ under the Equality Act 2010,164 or those which fall within Article 14 
Human Rights Act 1998’s predetermined statuses or the broader category of those with “other 
status.”165  
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Though this is of particular assistance when dealing with many of those who are affected by 
welfare reform programmes, especially claimants with disabilities, the necessity to draw a 
conduit between a protected group and those facing adverse impact in order to facilitate a 
challenge presents some problems. As is well established, the categories themselves are social 
constructs, and membership of them may be difficult to universally define by physical and 
societal parameters,166 and those within it may not have a base of shared experience.167 Others 
have criticised the homogenisation of certain groups, such as those with disabilities, into 
single groups with an associated single identity and set of problems.168 Referred to by Vellani 
as the “tyranny of the category,”169 pre-determined classifications like these struggle to deal 
with the complexity and intersectionality between these constructed groups.170  
This problem can be seen in some of the cases discussed above. For instance, in Zacchaeus 2000 
Trust171 and JS172, both judgments turned on the drawing of a conduit between the groups 
protected under the PSED or Article 14, and the negative impact complained of – the former 
concerned the protected characteristic of age and the impact of schoolchildren being forced to 
move schools, and the latter concerned a link between gender discrimination under Article 14 
and the UNCRC. In both cases, the link could not be adequately drawn so both cases 
consequently failed.  
The dependence on these procedural equality duties and anti-discrimination obligations runs 
the risk of giving “priority to groups who can congregate under a “status” label to the 
detriment of those living in poverty more generally.”186 The Coalition Government decided 
not to implement the softer requirement for public bodies to have “due regard” to 
socioeconomic disadvantage contained within the original formulation of the Equality Act 
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2010 due to concerns it would be unnecessary “red tape,”173 which follows the trend for legal 
protection from inequality for pre-determined statuses, but for socio-economic inequality to 
be “left to the welfare state.”174 Though it is clearly not for the courts to determine welfare state 
policy, this overreliance on limited statuses can prove particularly problematic as functions 




The discussion above has attempted to summarise some of the key findings of the more 
detailed report which underpins it.175 There are four key points worth emphasising in this 
concluding section.  
Firstly, it is clear that the package of measures introduced in the Welfare Reform Act 2012, and 
those which have followed in the Welfare Reform and Work Bill 2015, are not justified solely 
by the demands of “austerity.” Instead, throughout successive appeals, they are tied to other 
vehicular concepts,176 such as “fairness” and “localism,” which work to both ensure their 
ongoing legality and draw the decision making further into the “sphere of social policy.” 191 
These justifications can often be problematic and at times contradictory – particularly when 
budgets are cut at the same time responsibility is decentralised. This is not to say that these 
aims are not valid, or could not be nobly pursued by government. Indeed, the merits (or lack 
thereof) of austerity are well beyond the author’s remit. Instead it is suggested that this lack 
of clarity contributes to social rights being unable to play a heavier role in this “tricky 
debate”177 than they do at present.  
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Secondly, the dramatically increased role played by DHPs has been a central feature of the 
2010 welfare reform programme, and the discretionary payments are set to continue to be the 
key mitigation mechanism for further reforms, such as the lowering of the benefit cap.178 This 
extra layer of administrative discretion has been granted largely as an alternative to offering 
statutory exemptions to reforms, and as a consequence, political debates about those who 
should bear the weight of the welfare reform agenda has been blurred at the edges.179 Their 
treatment by the courts has been problematic, with a series of arguably misguided 
assumptions about their efficacy leading to an assessment that they justify otherwise 
unlawfully discriminatory welfare reforms.  
Thirdly, the heavy emphasis on procedural or discrimination-based challenges has led to a 
series of limitations, particularly in the assessment of cumulative impacts of welfare reforms, 
and problems associated with the categorisation of the disadvantaged. This approach comes 
at the expense of those who fall outside of protected categories, but nevertheless suffer unjust 
treatment. As the case-law continues to develop, more problems of this over-reliance are 
exposing themselves – particularly ongoing debates with treating eligibility  
requirements for discretionary assistance schemes (such as the council tax reduction scheme) 
as engaging A1P1. 180  More broadly, the difficulties of attempting to use human rights 
instruments as a means of offering proxy protection are increasingly being questioned.181  
Finally, it is worth noting the direction of the “shift” this chapter has attempted to deal with. 
Many areas of potential reforms are conspicuous by their absence; for example, the welfare 
reform programme deals almost exclusively with working-age benefits – pension credit and 
related passported benefits for those in retirement have been exempted from the “austerity” 
reforms. Instead, the direction of the “shift” is focused on “responsibilising”182 those out of 
work or in low-paid work, and introducing layers of further conditionality to enforce 
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adherence. It is a shift which has proven difficult to challenge using current public law tools, 
and one that is still ongoing.  
  
